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PREAMBLE 
The concept of ‘needs’ is foundational to any philosophy of human nature, rationality and 
human action. Beyond philosophy, many other disciplines such as psychology, economics, 
sociology, political science, social policy, ecology and sustainability, have engaged in ample 
research programs to address needs. Organization research makes no exception: its long 
history of interest in needs requires a separate monograph. At work, just as anywhere else in 
life, needs are omnipresent – yet in theorizing about needs no task has been more difficult 
than defining them.   
To complicate things further, the term ‘needs’ carries a heavy common use baggage, which 
tends to cloud rather than assist our understanding. In everyday English, for instance, we use 
‘need’ in ambiguous ways, in which the idea of lacking something necessary, useful or 
desirable combines with that of a motivating factor eliciting action to compensate for what is 
lacking. However, this amorphous list of vague (sometimes conflicting) interpretations does 
not capture the distinctive moral and political strength of claims associated with the concept 
of ‘needs’ as used in philosophy and most other fields of inquiry. Here, ‘needs’ claims 
catalyze efforts to create social institutions whose explicit raison d’être is to satisfy them. 
Such institutions are symptoms of our higher regard for social orders in which human dignity, 
freedom and meaningful life are protected and nurtured.  
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Based on this humanist agenda, it seems reasonable to expect that the study of organization 
should focus on the creation of more effective organizations, according to these criteria, as a 
matter of overriding concern. Yet, as suggested in this chapter, the history of ‘needs’ research 
in this field is far from consistent with a humanist agenda. Driven by a philosophically 
questionable connection with motivation, in organization research the concept of ‘needs’ has 
been vaguely and ambiguously employed to serve different (and sometimes conflicting) 
interests. In the competition for legitimacy between the needs of employees and the ‘needs’ 
of the organization, instrumental managerialism, marking the priority of the latter over the 
former, has triumphed.  
By encouraging a thorough exploration of the nature of needs, of their social construction and 
its ideological effects, philosophy can restore a primary interest in the potential of 
organizations to meet human needs. The purpose of this chapter is not to fully recount how 
needs have been conceptualized and theorized in either organization research or philosophy 
but to highlight the less explored contributions that philosophy can make to challenging 
organizational instrumentalism and to reviving the humanist agenda in the study of needs in 
organizations.  
This chapter begins by presenting a selection of key philosophical perspectives on needs, and 
then identifies some entrenched assumptions in the study of needs in organizations which, I 
argue, should be challenged. I then suggest some ways in which philosophy can be applied 
within organization research to unsettle these assumptions and forge new directions of 
thinking on this topic. Comments on further readings are also included.  
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NEEDS IN PHILOSOPHY 
A considerable amount of philosophical thought has been channelled into defining the 
concept of ‘needs’. When we appeal to needs as representing what is necessary, we tend to 
interpret this necessity in one of two very different ways. The first refers to what is needed 
relative to a pre-stated goal, of any kind; the second is about needs for avoiding serious harm 
(Thomson 2005) or, more broadly, for living a worthwhile life (Flew 1977). Engaging needs 
as instruments of goals that may lie outside the horizon of reflection is a dangerous prospect: 
surely, the Nazi regime needed many large gas chambers and sophisticated management 
systems in place in order to successfully carry out its social policies. It is, therefore, the 
second meaning of needs that is more useful, as it substantiates moral and political claims 
that can be generalized and, at the same time, provides a secure conceptual connection with 
humanist purposes, thus keeping the normative debate in sight. But, as the discussion of 
needs in organizations will show, awareness of both meanings is important in understanding 
the propensity of our arguments to oscillate uncritically and therefore allow instrumentalism 
to overtake humanist projects.  
Beyond safeguarding against the threat of instrumentalism, our interpretation of the source 
and nature of needs requires further investigation for other reasons as well. It is important to 
consider, for example, whether needs are objective, i.e. derived from given facts of nature, or 
whether they are (inter)subjectively determined through a collaborative creation of the 
meaning of ‘what is necessary’, within a certain understanding of the human condition and of 
its essence that is upheld in an individual’s conscience and/or shared within a community. 
In this context, it does not help at all that needs have often been confused with wants, desires, 
drives, motives and interests. Unlike wants and desires, for instance, needs are considered to 
have some empirical basis outside the wishes of the experiencing subject (Bay 1968, Marcuse 
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1964). They point to what is essential to living a worthwhile life, independently of what we 
may wish for at a particular point in time: thus, we may want things we do not need (or even 
things that cause us harm), and we may not want things we do need (Minogue 1963).  Wants, 
as signals routinely expressed in economic exchanges, gratify our sense of having, which is 
not essential to our whole-of-life purposes.  By contrast, needs refer to satisfying our sense of 
being and doing, which are essential in this way: nutriments for survival and labour as self-
creation are such examples (Marx 1932/1975). This distinction is important in legitimizing 
ways in which needs can be said to be ‘objective’.  
Furthermore, unlike desires, as conscious psychological states of wanting which can be 
insatiable, and unlike drives, their unconscious and much less controllable counterpart (Lacan 
1977), needs are finite, in that they are satisfied as soon as harm is avoided, and inescapable, 
in that they lead to harm when undiscovered and unsatisfied.  In addition, underneath 
Maslow’s (1954) axiomatic connection between needs and motivation lies another crucial 
conceptual distinction: while motives are emotionally and/or intellectually experienced 
reasons to act (Hume 1738/1978), needs may indicate the imperative of harm avoidance 
independently of the subject’s experiences (Doyal and Gough 1991, Thomson 2005) – which 
opens the possibility that others may understand our needs better than ourselves, as well as 
the possibility that we may be impaired, by various internal and external factors, in our ability 
to understand our own needs.  
But perhaps the most important and difficult distinction is between needs and interests. It has 
been said that needs respond to one’s core interests (Thomson 2005). We define our interests 
precisely in relation to what is good for our purposes, and core interests in terms of what is 
good for furthering our whole-of-life projects (Flew 1977). However, when defined by the 
imperative to avoid harm, needs are understood as a special kind of interests, leading to 
powerful moral and political claims of a special kind (Minogue 1963). Needs connect with 
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rights much more strongly than interests (Brock 2005), especially when both needs and rights 
are understood in universal terms, e.g. basic physiological needs such as food, water and 
shelter (Maslow 1954); and basic psychological needs such as affiliation, achievement and 
power (McClelland 1975) or autonomy, freedom and dignity (Ciulla 2000).  
Beside the humanist emphasis on an intrinsic relationship between needs, avoidance of harm 
and achievement of a worthwhile life, three philosophical themes are of particular interest as 
potential contributions to the study of needs in organizations: the objective versus subjective 
nature of needs; the existence or non-existence of a privileged locus of knowledge from 
which needs can be understood and evaluated (and, within this, the role of the experiencing 
subject); and, the subject’s moral tension between agency and dependence. The last two 
themes, in particular, have a political dimension of central importance for organization 
research.  
On whether needs are objective or subjectively experienced, the debate has often been fuelled 
by an unproductive dichotomy. While, at one end of the spectrum, nutrition can be regarded 
as an objectively necessary condition for physical survival – at the other end, needs for 
belonging and companionship, for instance, make little sense outside the evaluation of the 
experiencing subject. Both extremes are equally essential for living a worthwhile life, and 
there are also essential hybrids in between (e.g. security). Sen (1999) transcends this 
dichotomy by focusing on the process of evaluating needs. In this context, he defines needs 
as things that we have ‘good reason to value’ (Sen, 1999: 11) and develops a perspective on 
needs in which empirical evidence and value judgment stand in a dialectical relationship.  
However, making sense of a needs evaluation process rests not only on assumptions about the 
nature of the needs in question but also about the knowledge credentials of the evaluator. This 
raises the issue of who (if anyone in particular) is best placed to understand one’s needs and 
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therefore undertake an authoritative evaluation – whether it is experts (drawing their referent 
authority from a variety of sources), politicians, policy makers, philosophers, the public, 
communities, or individuals as experiencing subjects. For Marx (1845/1970), needs are 
socially constructed. In a strong sense, they are historically determined by the social order 
and its class structure. Consequently, just as needs are inescapable, so is the political 
dimension of needs claims.  
According to Habermas (1987), the flourishing of the human life-world should be the 
objective of a thorough analysis of political processes. It is only through communicative 
action that power differences are made explicit and an ethic of autonomous human fulfilment 
can have a chance. By democratizing the ways in which we construct and communicate 
meaning we are more likely to respond to our genuine needs and escape institutionalized 
alienation and oppression. But, while progressive in its political awareness, this perspective 
still assumes a sovereign subject, able to confidently assert their agency and have full control 
of their life and its meaning(s). In emphasizing the unconscious dimension of needs, Lacan 
(1966) questions this assumption, pointing to internal barriers to self-understanding.  
To this, postmodern philosophy adds two relevant discussions of external barriers and their 
internalization. As power structures and relations shape the very constitution of knowledge 
(Foucault, 1975/1995), our ability to independently know and understand our own needs is 
threatened. In fact, there is doubt as to whether individuals can even possess this ability in a 
consumer society, which uses discourse to constantly induce in individuals symbolic needs 
for social recognition and affirmation (Baudrillard, 1970/1988). Language, which is perhaps 
the most intimate conduit for our thoughts, is also a received body of signs and meanings 
structured by dominant ideologies. This suggests the absence of an Archimedean point from 
which the individual can autonomously experience their needs.  
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Baudrillard’s conclusion, however, does not erode the individual’s political claim to 
sovereignty. On the contrary, the tension between the imperative of protecting this 
sovereignty (Habermas 1971, 1987) and acknowledging the inescapable dependence entailed 
by needs claims (Lacan 1966, Thomson 2005) now takes a different turn. While, in 
mainstream liberal political thought (e.g. Hayek 1960), assumptions of full agency become a 
barrier to interest in needs, as the associated dependence is considered to be a source of 
paternalism and humiliation (Flew 1977), in postmodern thought awareness of the necessity 
to live with contingency (Heller and Feher 1988) gives new strength to the experiencing 
subject’s voice in expressing needs as moral and political claims.  
 
NEEDS IN ORGANIZATIONS 
Traditionally informed by industrial psychology research, organization studies of needs rely 
on theories that assume a necessary link between needs and motivation (e.g. Maslow1954, 
McClelland 1975). The managerial project, therefore, involves using needs as a predictor of 
human behaviour, in order to recommend best ways to harness employee motivation to 
benefit the organization and its goals. In the aftermath of the human relations movement 
initiated by Mayo (1933), most psychological studies of human needs in organizations 
maintained interest in human needs only insofar as it was compatible with other 
organizational interests. One step further, it was human needs that were being used to satisfy 
organizations, rather than organizations being engaged to meet human needs. Morgan (1997) 
recounts how the concept of ‘needs’ was incorporated by some systems theories within a 
metaphor of the organization as organism. This had the effect of humanizing the organization 
at the expense of de-humanizing the people who participated in it. As suggested by Grey 
(2013) and Watson (2013), later theories (e.g. Burns and Stalker 1961, Lawrence and Lorsch 
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1967) identified factors other than needs (e.g. organization culture) as drivers for individual 
motivation. These findings, combined with the conceptual subordination of needs to 
motivation, paved the way for a replacement of needs studies with corporate culture research. 
Significantly, overemphasis of the needs-motivation nexus has obscured the relationship 
between needs and harm, which is central to a humanist perspective.   
More successful in retaining a humanist focus on harm avoidance has been the adoption of 
concepts from development and welfare economics, in particular Sen’s (1985) capability 
approach, on organizational justice and bottom-of-the-pyramid business strategy research – 
but such studies are far less widespread.  
Beyond the uncritical instrumentalism that dominates needs research in organization studies, 
the theoretical frameworks employed in support of this research tend to entrench a set of 
philosophical assumptions that should, instead, be radically challenged. One such assumption 
emphasizes the objective aspects of needs over the subjective ones, with the effect of 
weakening the authority of the experiencing subject in the evaluation and interpretation of 
their needs. This also legitimates a second assumption, namely the existence of a privileged 
locus of knowledge about needs, which may be found in the manager, the organization, or the 
positivist empirical researcher who operates with the best instruments to apprehend such 
objective reality. Finally, this privileged position is assumed to be impartial and, as a 
consequence, glosses over political implications of the research process itself, despite the 
evident regularity of recommendations provided in the service of managerialist projects of the 
organization. The ideological effect of the organization developing discourses that promote 
full individual agency is, paradoxically, an increase of the individual’s dependence on the 
organization. For example, ‘soft’ people management dominated by corporate culturalism 
only allows for individual discretion under the patronage of organizational goals. This leads 
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to a silencing of the critical capacities of the employee to appraise and change their work 
situation independently of the organization’s imperatives (Alvesson and Willmott 1992).  
A radical challenge of the above assumptions can only occur through a systematic 
engagement with philosophical perspectives that revisit the role of subjectivity in needs 
evaluation, question the existence of privileged knowledge about needs, and engage with the 
moral tension between agency and dependence.  
Some attempts at challenging these assumptions have indeed been made. Of Marxist 
inspiration, labour process theory (Willmott 1997, Rowlinson and Hassard 2000) has 
occasionally been combined with welfare philosophy to theorize on meaningful work 
(Michaelson et al. 2014). Moreover, in undertaking a compelling critique of liberal political 
thought, Yeoman (2014) proposes a reconceptualization of meaningful work as a 
fundamental human need. Foucauldian analysis of power-knowledge relations has also been 
applied to rethink the psychological and social needs of workers in team work (Sewell 2005).  
Other attempts, while providing pertinent critique, fall short of engaging in a comprehensive 
study of needs. For example, in response to Kuchinke (2010)’s call for placing human 
development – and, with it, Sen’s capability approach – at the centre of human resource 
management practices, Fenwick (2011) observes that, even under explicit humanist priorities, 
a perspective that privileges objective over subjective dimensions of needs and overlooks the 
political factors at play in defining needs remains just as vulnerable to instrumentalism as 
traditional human resource management theories.  
Townley (1995) uses Foucault’s (1988) distinction between self-awareness and self-
formation as technologies of the self to deconstruct ‘management discourse as the 
interpretation and satisfaction of needs’ (Townley 1995: 273).  
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Adding to the critique of corporate culturalism, Hancock (1999) revisits psychological 
theories of human needs and their link with motivation, using Baudrillard’s notion of 
hyperreality to question our ability to understand our own needs independently of dominant 
ideologies of consumption. As objects dominate the subject, the only way to escape is to 
become indifferent to the world of objects and consumption and to avoid emotional 
investment in sign value and sign exchange.  
In sum, the above critiques suggest that there is much more to be said about needs, at a 
fundamental level, in the study of organizations, in ways that challenge the traditional 
paradigm.  
 
THE FUTURE OF NEEDS 
Philosophy can inform alternative perspectives on needs, by supporting the development of a 
humanist sensitivity to the vulnerable ‘self’ – a self who may not be autonomous, and not in 
full control and knowledge of their own needs, but nevertheless retains a political entitlement 
to sovereignty. In this context, the role of the organization is not to occupy the position of 
expert but to acknowledge and assume responsibility for the subtler, ideological, ways in 
which it induces human suffering, through the co-optation and colonization of discourses 
about needs. 
While systemically edited out of the organization’s discourse, this suffering is real. The 
current discourse of individual needs and agency, voiced by the organization within the 
framework of its goals, is inevitably reductionist, leaving the complex individual longing, 
speechless, for a space that has the power to dissent from the priorities of organizing. The 
individual thus suffers from an inability to pursue unpredictable experiences as a free and 
complex human being, as well as from an inability to articulate this suffering within the 
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boundaries of the established discourse. This kind of suffering is an indicator of what the 
organization, as a social system, leaves unattended to, and unsatisfied, in the people who 
spend their lives in it. In this context, applying a revised version of the Marxian concept of 
radical needs, to develop an alternative perspective on organizations and organizing as 
sources of social change, may prove useful. 
According to Heller’s (1974) synthesis of the Marxian theory of need, radical needs are needs 
that, necessarily, cannot be met by any needs-satisfying systems provided within the 
institutions of capitalism. The satisfaction of radical needs thus requires a revolutionary 
transformation of the economic system, e.g. from an economy of material production to one 
of leisure time, based on a different approach to surplus value distribution (Marx 1862/1969). 
With the benefit of directly experiencing socialism as dictatorship over needs (Heller et al. 
1983), philosophers of the Budapest School, Heller in particular, have filtered the concept of 
radical needs through postmodern reflection, thus usefully replacing Marxian deterministic 
premises with a view of the individual’s existential and political condition as contingent 
(Heller and Feher 1988).   
Leaving aside the all-encompassing, macro level ambitions of Marx’s grand narrative, the 
idea of transforming social systems to satisfy (rather than perpetuate) radical needs may be 
productive when adapted to the level of needs-satisfying systems in organizations. In the 
interpretation proposed here, radical needs, which by necessity cannot be satisfied by the 
existing modes of organizing, contain the seed of change. Exploration of radical needs 
satisfying systems would thus support innovative humanist projects at organizational level, 
leading to alternative modes of organizing.  Research of radical needs responsive organizing 
may provide a fertile, constructive direction following philosophical critiques of traditional 
needs studies.  
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In response to the issue of privileging objective over subjective dimensions of needs, the 
concept of radical needs focuses, from its Marxian inception, on abundant examples of harm 
derived not from purely objective sources but anchored in the social experiences of the 
subject. The human needs associated with these experiences are both real and fundamental to 
living a worthwhile, fully human life (Marx 1932/1975). Furthermore, on the existence of a 
privileged locus of knowledge about needs, Heller rejects this implication of Marxian needs 
theory and suggests, instead, a postmodern ethic that enables the individual to live and 
develop their humanness in a world where there are no absolute points of reference, where 
our only perennial epistemic and political condition is contingency (Heller and Feher 1988). 
Despite the loss of ultimate authority on needs evaluation, distinguishing between needs and 
wants is still, logically (Thomson 2005) and ethically (Heller and Feher 1988), possible. On 
the moral tension between agency and dependence, focus on radical needs should combine 
Lacan’s (1966) perspective on (un)conscious needs as defined by appeal to another for their 
satisfaction with Heller and Feher’s (1988) investment in the agency of the subject as the 
liberating (albeit daunting) effect of assuming a contingent world. By developing practices of 
radical needs responsive organizing as grassroots movements, by taking ownership of these 
systemic change processes, people in organizations may be better able to acknowledge their 
dependence on one another through empowerment rather than humiliation.  
These alternative modes of organizing may actively respond to radical needs by providing 
opportunities for developing talents, enduring relationships and rich experiences as catalysts 
of new life projects. Therefore, an organization should: allow space for existential self-
critique and, with it, for critiques of its goals, systems and structures; renounce assumptions 
of interests alignment and accept a plurality of terms on which different individuals choose to 
engage with it; and recognize the right of any individual, irrespective of their status and 
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position, to open new spaces for self-determination, of themselves and others – by nurturing 
reciprocal (rather than hierarchical) relations.  
Whether the postmodern organization, imagined as a work environment adjusted for the 
open-ended self-realization of complex human beings, is at all possible is a matter for 
validation by both theory and practice. Whatever the answer, philosophical reflection remains 
indispensable to challenging the dominant paradigm and forging new ways forward in the 
humanist study of needs in organization research.   
 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING  
From an organization research perspective, Grey (2013) provides an insightful account of the 
place of needs theories in the history of organization studies, between scientific management 
and corporate culturalism. From a philosophical perspective, Doyal and Gough’s (1991) 
theory of universal and objective needs is prefaced by a set of counterarguments to several 
schools that criticize the basic needs concept, thus providing a useful sketch of the debate 
about the objective versus subjective dimensions of needs. More philosophical debates 
around needs are summarized in Reader (2005).  
For further theory building, Heller and Feher’s The Postmodern Political Condition (1988) is 
recommended, as it offers a refreshing interpretation of the human condition in today’s world, 
theorizes on needs satisfaction post consumer society and develops a political agenda on this 
basis. For the time-pressed reader searching for a thematic synthesis of needs theories across 
domains and paradigms, Dean (2010) offers some useful taxonomies.  
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